






J UDITH RE SN IK 
Equality’s Frontiers: Courts Opening and Closing 
This Essay was adapted from remarks delivered at Equality’s Frontiers, a panel 
discussion celebrating Justice Ginsburg’s gender-equality jurisprudence and analyzing 
its relationship with new developments in the law of equality. The discussion preceded 
Justice Ginsburg’s Gruber Distinguished Lecture in Women’s Rights, held on October 
19, 2012, at Yale University. 
 
In the 1930s, during the Depression, the federal government funded jobs 
through the Works Projects Administration (WPA), supporting new 
construction projects as well as artworks around the country. Hundreds of 
buildings went up, including a new federal courthouse and post office in Aiken, 
South Carolina. The art commission went to an artist from the Northeast, who 
provided a large mural, called Justice as Protector and Avenger, installed behind a 
judge’s bench in a courtroom.1 (See Figure 1.) 
The central female figure is a reference to the Renaissance Virtue Justice—
familiar to us all because she is regularly deployed in courthouses around the 
world. But the WPA artist explained that his “figure of ‘Justice’” was “without 
any of the customary . . . symbolic representations (scale, sword, book . . .).” 
He said that the only “allegory” he had permitted himself was “to use the red, 





1.  All rights reserved, Judith Resnik, 2013. My discussion of this image and the controversy 
surrounding it is drawn from JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: 
INVENTION, CONTROVERSY AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 
110-13 & 457-59 nn.68-101 (2011). The quoted materials are from books and articles cited 
therein. 
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What did others see? A local newspaper objected to this “barefooted 
mulatto woman wearing bright-hued clothing.” The federal judge in whose 
courtroom the mural appeared termed it a “monstrosity”—a “profanation of 






2.  Stefan Hirsch, Justice as Protector and Avenger (1938), U.S. Courthouse and Post Office, 
Aiken, S.C. (renamed in 1986 as the Charles E. Simons, Jr., Federal Courthouse). Image 
reproduced courtesy of the Fine Arts Collection, United States General Services 
Administration (GSA). 
Given the size of the reproduction, a bit more description of the image is in order, as 
we provided in RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 111. GSA materials written in the 1990s 
describe this Justice as raising a “nurturing right hand to those who live righteously,” 
while her left hand “repels miscreants with a condemning gesture.” Under the side labeled 
“Protector,” Hirsch painted rolling hills, cows near a barn or house, children playing, a 
woman holding a baby, and a lamp and plow at the bottom of the frame. Under the label 
“Avenger,” Hirsch portrayed crimes: a house burns, a man holds open a door to a prison cell 
through which a man (garbed in prison stripes) appears either to be entering or to be 
leaving, and another man is crouching where a woman’s body lies, with a shotgun below. 
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The artist protested that observers, if truly impartial, could not conclude 
“that the figure’s face . . . appears to have negroid traits. I should not only be 
willing but anxious to obliterate this ‘blemish,’ because I had certainly intended 
nothing of the sort.” A federal government official from the Department of the 
Treasury responded, “I must confess that the palette of the head . . . and the 
vivid red lips . . . would [make it] easy to . . . conclu[de] that the figure is 
mulatto.” 
A “compromise” was proposed to “lighten Justice’s skin color.” But others, 
including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
objected. The denouement was to cover the mural with a tan velvet curtain, 
seen at the edges of Figure 1. 
At the same time that the “mulatto” Justice was draped because she was 
seen to be unsightly, another series of WPA murals were placed on the walls of 
the Ada County Courthouse in Idaho. (See Figure 2.) A news report later 
described one scene as an “Indian in buckskin . . . on his knees with his hands 
bound behind his back . . . flanked by one man holding a rifle, and another 
armed man holding one end of a noose dangling from a tree.”3 
No objections were recorded at the time to this display of a lynching in a 
courthouse. But toward the end of the twentieth century, a judge in Idaho 
concluded that the imagery was offensive. The judge ordered that the mural be 
draped with flags of the state and of the United States. 
In 2006, the temporary use of the facility by the legislature (whose own 
building was under repair) prompted new questions about whether to continue 
to hide the mural or paint it over. The state legislature, in consultation with 
Indian tribes, decided instead that the mural should remain in view, framed by 
official, educational interpretive signs to explain that the picture reflected “the 
values” held at that time.4 
Why start this discussion of equality’s frontiers with pictures from the 1930s? 
These pictures make a first point—that courts were one of equality’s frontiers. 
The conflicts about what could or could not be shown on courthouse walls 
mirrored conflicts about what rights people had in court. In the 1930s, just as a 
“mulatto” could not serve uncontested as a representation of Justice, people 
labeled “mulattos” were given little protection in courts as a matter of law. 
 
 
3.  John Miller, Idaho Murals of Lynching Spark Debate, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04/13/idaho_murals_of_lynching_spark 
_debate. 














5.  Mural (circa 1939) (photograph taken 2007), Old Ada County Courthouse, Ada, Idaho. 
Copyright: Paul Hosefros for Lemley International. Photograph reproduced with the 
permission of photographer Paul Hosefros. This discussion draws on RESNIK & CURTIS, 
supra note 1, at 116-17 & 460 nn.123-30. 
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Look then at the next image—a 2010 picture of the current Supreme Court 
with its nine Justices, including our honoree, the inaugural Gruber Lecturer, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. (See Figure 3.) This picture underscores a second point, 
which is the importance of appreciating the remarkable change that has taken 
place in the last seventy-five years, during which time courts were reinvented 
as institutions welcoming all of us. Today, every person—regardless of gender, 
race, and ethnicity—is authorized to play all roles—from litigant and lawyer to 
witness and juror to Supreme Court Justice. This idea is both relatively new 
and deeply radical when held against that 1938 baseline—when a “mulatto” 
Justice had to be shrouded in drapes because neither state nor federal officials 


























6.  Justices, United States Supreme Court (2010). Copyright: Steve Petteway, Collection of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Image reproduced courtesy of the Office of the 
Curator, Photographic Collections, United States Supreme Court. 
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My third point is that getting into court is not the same as being treated as 
an equal in court. In the 1960s and thereafter, as lawyers were bringing claims 
against sex stereotyping, they found that some of the presiding judges in their 
cases shared the very same prejudices and biases as those of the defendants 
being challenged. To respond, in the late 1970s, the NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund created a National Judicial Education Program that the 
National Association of Women Judges (also founded in the late 1970s) joined. 
The effort focused on using local examples to help judges see a range of 
illustrations of the problems women faced. In the early 1980s, the Chief Justice 
of New Jersey decided to commission a “Task Force” on “gender bias in the 
courts.”7 
Some sixty jurisdictions followed thereafter, producing official reports 
discussing the treatment of women and men of all colors in state and federal 
courts. One excerpt, from New Jersey in the mid-1980s, is the placeholder here 
for thousands of pages of documentation. That report concluded that 
“stereotyped myths, beliefs, and biases were found to sometimes affect judicial 
decision-making . . . in domestic violence, juvenile justice, matrimonial law, 
and sentencing,” and that there was “strong evidence” of differential treatment 
of women and men in courts and chambers.8 A decade later, in 1996, Justice 
Ginsburg wrote the foreword to another study, The Report of the Special 
Committee on Gender, prepared for the federal courts for the District of 
Columbia. As she put it, the “trend towards greater equality” was by then 
apparent but so was “the need for vigilance.”9 
Turn from the problems of those inside courthouses to the problems of 
others, standing at the door. Today, we can celebrate that “race, gender, and 
other incidents of birth” no longer provide formal barriers to courts.10 But we 
have little to celebrate when considering the impact of class, which, of course, 
intersects with “race, gender, and other incidents of birth.” As Justice Ginsburg 
has discussed, unless people have “full purses or political muscle,” they cannot 
afford to bring cases.11 
 
7.  FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE 
COURTS, JUNE 1984, reprinted in 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 129, 129 (1986) [hereinafter TASK 
FORCE ON WOMEN]. Justice Ginsburg, a law professor at Rutgers from 1963 to 1972, helped 
to found the Women’s Rights Law Reporter. See WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP., 
http://pegasus.rutgers.edu/~wrlr/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
8.  TASK FORCE ON WOMEN, supra note 7, at 136. 
9.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword, 84 GEO. L.J. 1651, 1655 (1996). 
10.  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Access to Justice in the United States, 7 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2001). 
11.  Id. 
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My fourth point, therefore, focuses on the relationship between the 
Constitution of the United States and the needs of poor people. The 
questions—sitting on equality’s frontiers—are about how much governments 
are obliged to fund courts and to subsidize users—either individually or by 
facilitating claims brought in the aggregate through class actions or other 
mechanisms. Yet other questions relate to what claims law recognizes as 
warranting a hearing on the merits in public before impartial judges. 
To turn to a concrete example, consider what happened to Melissa 
Lumpkin Brooks, or “M.L.B.” as she is known in the annals of the Supreme 
Court. After a divorce, her husband asked the Mississippi courts to terminate 
her rights as a mother so his new wife could adopt Ms. Brooks’s two young 
children. Ms. Brooks lost at trial and wanted to appeal; her argument was that 
the exacting burden of proof—of clear and convincing evidence that she had 
neglected or abandoned her children—had not been met. But she could not 
afford to pay the $2,353.36 for a transcript of the trial and related records 
below,12 and Mississippi law had no provision for waiving any fees on 
appeal.13 
What does the U.S. Constitution have to say about a poor civil litigant’s 
right to get an appeal? The Supreme Court held in the 1970s that poverty was 
not a “suspect classification” under the Equal Protection Clause.14 Further, the 
Court has held that, to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a 
plaintiff has to show intentional discrimination; disparate impact is generally 
not enough.15 
What about the Due Process Clause? In 1971, a landmark opinion required 
Connecticut to waive a fifteen-dollar filing fee for Gladys Boddie, who was 
seeking a divorce.16 But, in the years thereafter, the Court said that the Due 
Process Clause did not require fees to be waived for someone filing in 
 
12.  M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The figure of $2,352.36 included $1,900 for the 
transcript (950 pages at $2 per page); $438 for other documents in the record (219 pages at 
$2 per page); $4.36 for binders; and $10 for mailing. Id. at 108. 
13.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied Ms. Brooks’s motion for leave to appeal in forma 
pauperis. Order (Aug. 18, 1995), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 3, M.L.B., 
519 U.S. 102 (No. 95-853) (“The right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases exists only 
at the trial level.”). It then dismissed her appeal. Order (Aug. 31, 1995), reprinted in Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari app. at 1, M.L.B., 519 U.S. 102 (No. 95-853). 
14.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
15.  See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
16.  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
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bankruptcy17 or for a person losing welfare benefits and unable to pay Oregon’s 
twenty-five-dollar fee to review the decision.18 The few cases that have required 
state subsidies for indigent appellants involve providing funds for criminal 
defendants to obtain transcripts on appeal.19 
Given these Supreme Court decisions, the State of Mississippi argued that 
Ms. Brooks had no right to more—that a three-day hearing was all the process 
due, that no intent to discriminate existed, and that requiring a state to 
“subsidize” Ms. Brooks’s civil appeal would create a “new constitutional 
right.”20 
In 1996, Justice Ginsburg, writing for six members of the Court, 
disagreed. She refused to resort to what she called “easy slogans or 
pigeonhole analysis”21 and instead concluded that an amalgam of equal 
protection and due process principles required the State to provide funds for 
the transcript on appeal. Equal protection, she wrote, related “to the legitimacy 
of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core 
costs.”22 Due process spoke to the “essential fairness of the state-ordered 
proceedings.”23 The Court held that the fundamental nature of the right to 
parent, coupled with the absolutism of the termination order that was 
supposed to be predicated on clear and convincing evidence, meant that poor 
litigants could not be left without appellate review.24 On remand, Ms. Brooks’s 
visitation rights were restored.25 
 
17.  United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
18.  Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973). Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), did strike 
down an Oregon statute requiring a double appeal bond for tenants seeking to appeal 
evictions; the Court held that the arbitrary burdening of tenants’ statutory right to appeal 
violated equal protection. 
19.  See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, (1956); see also Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 
189 (1971). 
20.  Brief for Respondents at 14, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853). 
21.  M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983)). 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. at 107. 
25.  M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d, 806 So. 2d 1023 
(Miss. 2000). On remand, the Mississippi Court of Appeals split seven to three. 
 
courts opening and closing 
251 
 
While path-breaking, the judgment in M.L.B. is also very limited. The 
ruling rests on the unique nature of parental-rights terminations, which are a 
very small fraction of the family matters before any court. For example, as 
Justice Ginsburg’s decision recounted, between the years of 1980 and 1996, 
only sixteen such appeals were filed in the Mississippi courts.26 
Consider data from New York State in 2010, when 2.3 million civil litigants 
were in that state’s courts (in filed cases) but without lawyers. More than 
ninety-five percent of parents in cases involving child support were 
unrepresented.27 These high numbers of “pro ses” (proceeding “for 
themselves”) are replayed throughout the country in state and federal courts. 
As a consequence, a new effort, called “civil Gideon,” is underway. That 
movement is named after Gideon v. Wainwright,28 a case celebrating its fiftieth 
anniversary in 2013. Gideon is famous for its mandate that states must subsidize 
poor criminal defendants facing felony charges by providing them with 
lawyers. 
Advocates of civil Gideon argue that both state and federal constitutions 
ought to be read to require lawyers when other fundamental legal issues 
involving family, housing, or health are at stake. A few states have embraced 
this idea for certain kinds of cases. 
But, in 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court set this effort back.29 The case 
involved another parent, Michael Turner, who asked that South Carolina 
provide him with a free lawyer when charged with civil contempt for his failure 
to pay his child’s mother some $6,000 in support. Turner lost in South 
Carolina and served a twelve-month sentence.  In 2011, Justice Breyer wrote for 
a majority of the Court that included Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan. In some respects, the case is a victory in that the group of five 
joined together to insist on rights to fair process. The Court concluded, over 
objections from the dissent, that Mr. Turner had a right to “fundamentally 
fair” procedures and that South Carolina had not accorded him a sufficiently 
fair procedure. But the Court rejected a reading of the federal Constitution to 
require that lawyers be appointed for indigent civil-contempt defendants 
 
26.  M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 122 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 20, 25, M.L.B., 519 U.S. 102 (No. 95-
853)). 
27.  See TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE CHIEF 
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1 (Nov. 2010), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil 
-legal-services/PDF/CLS-TaskForceREPORT.pdf (“97 percent of parents are unrepresented 
in child support matters in New York City, and 95 percent are unrepresented in the rest of 
the State . . . .”). 
28.  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
29.  Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
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whose adversaries were “private” parties (and in this instance, unrepresented), 
even if those defendants could end up, like Michael Turner, in jail for a year.30 
In the absence of state-funded lawyers, the Court held, states had to provide 
alternative mechanisms to ensure that civil-contempt proceedings were 
fundamentally fair. Included on the Court’s list were notice that the question of 
the defendant’s ability to pay was central, information about how to document 
income, and “an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability 
to pay.”31 
Thus far, I have provided examples of involuntary defendants: parents at 
risk of losing their children or their liberty and individuals in need of various 
kinds of subsidies. These are not the only needy litigants. Consider also 
individuals who want to come to court as civil plaintiffs, for example, to stop 
their evictions or mortgage foreclosures, to argue that they have been subjected 
to sex discrimination at work, or to claim that the phone company has violated 
consumer protection laws and overcharged them. 
Private lawyers have little interest in representing such people because, if a 
case is filed individually, the costs are too high and the economic damages too 
low. The Legal Services Corporation does not have enough lawyers to 
represent all who meet even its very restrictive eligibility requirements. It is 
either class actions, other forms of aggregation, civil Gideon—or the cases are 
not filed at all. Yet in the 2011 Term, the Supreme Court both set back civil 
Gideon and made it more difficult to file class actions.32 
To conclude, let me sketch how the pieces of the narrative I have provided 
fit together. The project of the twentieth century was to get all of us—
everyone—into court and thereby to make true historic promises found in 
dozens of state constitutions: that individuals have rights to come to open 
courts to obtain redress for injuries to their persons and property. It is a 
remarkable achievement that, once the courthouse doors were opened, so many 
individuals and such a range of individuals have come to court to seek redress. 
More than fifty million cases (traffic, family, and juvenile cases not included) 
are filed annually in state courts. One should read that number as a tribute to 
our democratic court system, in that millions understand courts as a 
government-provided service to which they can and do turn. 
 
30.  Id. at 2520. 
31.  Id. at 2519. 
32.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507; AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) (analyzing the relationship among and the barriers imposed by the 
three decisions). 
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The question for the twenty-first century is what to do with all those now 
eligible to come to court to try to enforce rights. The answers I have discussed 
so far are insufficient, for they help a tiny subset of civil litigants. What is 
needed instead is a broader conception of constitutional obligations founded 
on deepening the meaning of equality and recognizing the positive relationship 
between government and its citizenry. Insights into how to fashion its contours 
come from one last example of Justice Ginsburg’s opinions, again involving 
courthouse barriers—in this instance, physical barriers. This image captures 
the problem. (See Figure 4.) The picture shows protesters at the Supreme 
Court who were demonstrating the challenges that courthouse steps pose for 


























33.  Demonstrators at the United States Supreme Court, accompanying the story Court To Rule on 
Protections for Disabled, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 14, 2004). Photographer: Gerald Herbert. 
Copyright: AP Photos/Gerald Herbert. Reproduced with the permission of the Associated 
Press. 
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This demonstration was on the day of oral argument in a lawsuit brought 
by George Lane, a paraplegic who had literally crawled up stairs in a Tennessee 
courthouse in order to respond to criminal charges.34 He then filed a lawsuit 
arguing that the state owed him damages for violations of a federal statute, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. Tennessee responded that it had constitutional 
immunity, as a sovereign, from the damage action. 
Five Justices held that the state could be held liable; Justice Ginsburg wrote 
separately to concur.35 She explained that the Americans with Disabilities Act 
embodied “not blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to difference; not 
indifference, but accommodation.”36 The holding is, of course, limited to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, just as the M.L.B. decision about rights to 
state-paid transcripts is limited to parents facing the loss of their rights. But the 
ideas in both are about the essential function courts play in recognizing and 
producing the equal citizenship of all persons. Both decisions make plain that 
formal equality is not enough and that substantive equality can only come 
through making accommodations that take specific barriers into account. The 
larger claim is that governments ought to be proud to provide courts as a social 
service and to subsidize both users and court infrastructure, just as 
governments fund police services and prisons as well as education, roads, and 
postal services in efforts to support and to generate functioning and flourishing 
democratic polities. 
I close then with one final image, which is of the entry to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. (See Figure 5.) This picture shows the top of the stairs that the Lane 
protesters were trying to crawl up. Etched at the top of the Court’s entrance are 
the words “Equal Justice Under Law.” In 1935, when the building opened, 
those words were aspirational, inscribed decades before all persons were 
recognized as juridical equals in courts.37 
Please read these words as a sign, marking a current frontier whose 
challenges and contours we are just beginning to appreciate. 
 
 
34.  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 514 (2004) (“At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two 
flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. When Lane returned to the courthouse for a 
hearing, he refused to crawl again or to be carried by officers to the courtroom; he 
consequently was arrested and jailed for failure to appear.”). 
35.  Id. at 535 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justices Souter and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion. Justice Souter also filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Id. 
at 534 (Souter, J., concurring). 
36.  Id. at 536 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
37.  “Equal Justice Under Law” is an “ideal that remains aspirational.” Ginsburg, supra note 10, 
at 2. 
 






































38.  The Contemplation of Justice and the Inscription “Equal Justice Under Law” (1935), United 
States Supreme Court, Wash., D.C. Photographer: Lois Long, Collection of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Image reproduced courtesy of the Office of the Curator, 
Photographic Collections, United States Supreme Court. 
 




*                 *                * 
 
Justice Ginsburg offered the following response: 
  That was splendid. You’re right that M.L.B. is a very limited 
decision. It didn’t even say that the mother fighting to be recognized as 
a parent of her children had a right to a lawyer. The sole question was 
whether she could be denied the right to appeal a decision terminating 
her parental status simply because she lacked the money to pay for a 
transcript of the trial. She didn’t urge the right to have a lawyer 
because, in fact, she had one—a volunteer lawyer represented her. 
  One of Judge Guido Calabresi’s colleagues, Judge Robert Katzmann 
of the Second Circuit, has recognized a need for representation by 
counsel that cries out for attention. It is the problem of immigrants 
caught in the toils of the deportation (now called removal) process. 
Often they appear without counsel; sometimes they engage lawyers 
who deceive them; sometimes their counsel is unable to speak their 
language. Their plight doesn’t come within the Gideon doctrine because 
removal proceedings are typed “civil.” M.L.B. makes a small breach in 
the line between civil cases, in which you don’t get state-paid 
assistance, and criminal cases, in which you do. Judge Katzmann is 
making valiant efforts to alert the bar to the plight of the immigrant. 
His message: if you are truly a member of a learned profession, you will 
step forward and provide the assistance these people need.  
 
*                 *                * 
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